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Naval Missions and the Law of the Sea
MARK W. JANIS*
Navies are some of the most important users of the oceans.
Jane's Fighting Ships lists 126 national naval forces.' Many
navies, however, are quite small. Only 47 have a vessel as large
as a frigate or a destroyer, and only 14 have at least one cruiser
or aircraft carrier.2 Among all navies, four stand out not only
in terms of size but in terms of capability. The world's four most
powerful navies are those of the United States, the Soviet Union,
Great Britain, and France. Only these four navies boast the SSBN,
nuclear powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles.3 These
four navies, more than any others, have the potential for substantial
naval operations away from home ports. Such operations include
showing the flag, protecting shipping, and intervention ashore.
* The author is a graduate of Princeton and of Oxford where he re-
ceived an M.A. in Jurisprudence. He taught international law and relations
at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and was a Research
Associate of the Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College, New-
port, Rhode Island. He is currently a J.D. candidate at the Harvard Law
School. The views in this paper are only those of the author and in no
way should be taken to reflect the opinions of the Navy, the Naval War
College, or the Naval Postgraduate School.
1. JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1974-1975 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
2. Id. at 642-43.
3. It is possible that the People's Republic of China is developing an
SSBN, but none is thus far operational. Id. at 78.
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These -two attributes, nuclear deterrent and distant-water cap-
abilities, put these four navies into a class by themselves.
Since both SSBN operations and distant-water activities depend
upon the right to navigate outside internal and territorial waters,
it might be expected that the naval interests of the United States,
the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France would tend to favor
traditional high seas freedoms. It is, in fact, commonly assumed
that free transit through international straits and the preservation
of liberal navigation rights outside a 12-mile territorial sea would
be to the advantage of the four major navies. 4 It is generally true
that the naval operations of the four countries are facilitated by
transit rights through straits and navigation rights along coastlines.
This paper suggests, however, that the facilitation is greater for
some navies and naval missions than for others.
THE SOVIET NAVY
The analysis begins with the navy of the Soviet Union not
because the Soviet Navy is the most or least powerful of the four,5
but because the interests of the Soviet Navy are those most tied
to the preservation of freedom of navigation.
Between 1972 and 1973 the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet
Navy, Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, published an important series of
articles, Navies in War and Peace, in the Soviet Union's Naval
Digest. Reserving the first half of the final installment for a con-
sideration of law of the sea questions,6 Gorshkov stressed the need
to preserve free transit of straits:
[W]ith the adoption of a 12-mile limit for the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea, more than 110 straits being used for international ship-
ping will turn out to be closed territorial seas of littoral states. It
is evident that this may have a considerable effect on the legal
status of those straits which until now have been part of the high
4. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIB. OF CONG., SOVIET OCEAN ACTIVITIES: A PiE-
LIImNARY SuRVEY 75-81 (1975); Debr, France's Global Strategy, 49 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 395, 402 (1971); Hearn, The Fourth Dimension of Seapower-Ocean
Technology and International Law, 22 JAG J. 23, 25 (1967); O'Connell,
Naval Policy and International Law and International Relations, in BiTAIN
AND THE SEA 32 (1973) (Papers and Records of a Conference at the Royal
Naval College, Greenwich, Sept. 12-14, 1973).
5. Most observers rank the Soviet Navy as a strong second to the United
States Navy. JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1971-1972 at 80 (R. Blackman ed.
1971).
6. Gorshkov, Navies in War and Peace, 100 U.S. NAy. INST. PROC. 11,
55-60 (1974) (translated from MoRsKOY SEORNIu 1972-1973). For a more
thorough analysis of the piece see Janis, The Soviet Navy and Ocean Law,
26 NAY. WAR COLL. Rsv. 5, 52 (1974).
[VOL. 13: 583, 1976] Naval Missions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
seas and which have been used for navigation without any sort of
limitations. Therefore, in those straits which connect the open seas
and are used for international shipping, all transiting ships (and
in the wider straits also aircraft flying overhead) must be accorded
freedom of transit and overflight.7
Gorshkov also noted the need to limit claims to extensive territorial
seas:
The key to the solution of this question [claims to 200-mile terri-
torial seas] is the strict establishment of limitations on the breadths
of territorial seas .... Based on existing practice and a sensible
combination of interests of coastal states with principles of the free-
doms of the high seas, it would seem completely acceptable to limit
the breadth of the territorial sea to limits of up to 12 miles.8
That these positions advance Soviet naval interests is clear from
an examination of Soviet naval missions, capability, and geography.
Earlier articles in Admiral Gorshkov's series establish three broad
missions for the Soviet Navy: defense of the homeland, sea denial,
and naval presence. The defense of the homeland mission includes
both strategic deterrence, for which the Soviet Navy provides about
50 SSBNs, and conventional defense, for which the Soviet Navy
provides over 300 submarines and a considerable land-based air
armY The submarine forces join about 200 surface combatants
(cruisers, destroyers, frigates) and about 800 other craft to fulfill
the other two missions.10 Gorshkov visualizes Soviet sea denial
largely in terms of denying the United States Navy access to foreign
theaters such as the Mediterranean, the Mid-East, the Far East, and
South Asia." There is no doubt that these forces also have the
capability to interdict to some extent the West's maritime commerce
and lines of communication. 12 The third role, naval presence, is
seen both as a prestige symbol and as a demonstration of "the eco-
nomic and military might of a country beyond its borders during
peacetime."' 3
7. Gorshkov, supra note 6, at 58.
8. Id.
9. JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPs 1974-1975, at 535-38, 639, 642 (J. Moore ed.
1974).,
10. Id. at 642.
11. Gorshkov, Navies in War and Peace, 1O0 U.S. NAY. INST. PROC. 10, 61-
62 (1974) (translated from MORSKEY SBORNIK 1972-1973).
12. B. M. BLEcEmAN, THE CHANGING Sov-mr NAVY 26-29 (1973).
13. Gorshkov, supra note 11, at 59.
The Soviet Navy, however, faces important geographical con-
straints. Of the Soviet Navy's four fleets, only the Northern Fleet
based in Murmansk has an ice-free, straits-free route to the open
oceans. The Baltic Fleet is not only plagued with ice in the winter
but must transit the Danish Straits to reach the North Sea and
the Atlantic. The Black Sea Fleet must transit the Turkish Straits
to reach the Mediterranean and then the Straits of Gibraltar to
reach the Atlantic, or the Suez Canal to reach the Indian Ocean.
Most of the Pacific Fleet must pass through the straits of the Sea
of Japan to reach the Pacific.
Soviet SSBN forces are based at Murmansk (for the Atlantic)
and at Petropavlosk on the Kamchatka Peninsula (for the Pacific)
where no narrow straits passages are necessary. 1 4 A 12-mile terri-
torial sea, however, could affect the passage of Soviet vessels
through the Straits of Gibraltar to reach the Atlantic, through some
of the straits of the Sea of Japan from Vladivostock to reach the
Pacific, and through the Indonesian straits to reach the Indian
Ocean. A 200-mile territorial sea would encircle the Soviet Union
with territorial seas except in the northwestern Pacific. This,
theoretically at least, could endanger Soviet access to the Atlantic
from Murmansk through the gaps between Greenland/Iceland and
Iceland/United Kingdom and threaten not only surface vessel but
submarine operations as well.
These geographical concerns add to the interest of the Soviet
Navy in navigation rights. The greater the operating range of
SSBNs, the more difficult their location and destruction. In order
to challenge the Western navies in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean,
the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific, the Soviet Navy needs to exit
from internal positions. In order to show a naval presence, the
same is true. Admiral Gorshkov's law of the sea positions follow
naturally from his statement of Soviet naval missions and from the
geographical situation of the Soviet Union.
THE BRrnSH NAVY
The Royal Navy follows in the analysis because British naval in-
terests provide the greatest contrast to Soviet naval interests. Al-
though British naval power was foremost in the 19th and early
20th centuries, today the Royal Navy is a distant third to the United
States and Soviet navies and is still slipping.15 When the Royal
14. J. Deaton, The Significance of International Straits to Soviet Naval
Operations, 31-32, 47-48, 111-12 (1975) (unpublished Naval Postgraduate
School Master's thesis, Monterey, Cal.).
15. G. LEE, SEA PowER: Ti RoYAL NAVY 8 (1973).
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Navy was tasked with protecting Britains' far-flung colonies and
trade routes, the British naval interest in freedoms of the high seas
was clear. A new nature of British naval interests in law of the
sea issues can be seen against the background of the changing
missions and composition of the Royal Navy.
In the past three decades, there has been a significant reduction
in the scope of British naval operations. The Royal Navy, which
carried out almost global responsibilities in 1945, today is committed
principally to regional duties. The current status of British naval
missions can be seen in ithe British government's Statement on the
Defence Expenditures 1975.16 Three roles for the Royal Navy
emerge: maintaining Britain's nuclear deterrent, providing the
largest part of Britain's and NATO's maritime defense in the East-
ern Atlantic Channel areas, and to a much lesser extent protecting
British and NATO interests in other regions.
The entire British strategic deterrent is based upon the Royal
Navy's four SSBNs: Renown, Repulse, Resolution, and Re-
venge.17 Because of Britain's position on the Atlantic, no restric-
tions on navigation rights through straits or along coasts would
threaten the access of Britain's SSBNs to the high seas and to
relative security in the deep oceans.
The second and third missions of the Royal Navy are the con-
cern of the remainder of the British fleet which includes an air-
craft carrier, two helicopter carriers, about 75 surface combatants,
about 30 submarines, and about 350 other vessels.'8 The Royal
Navy's defensive role in the waters around Britain is seen largely
in terms of offsetting the Soviet Navy's strength.
These [the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas] are the forward
sea areas of NATO corresponding to the Central Region on land, in
which NATO's maritime forces face the growing power of the
Soviet Navy.
All the sea-borne supply and reinforcement routes from North
America to Britain and the European mainland pass through these
areas. If the balance of maritime power were allowed to shift so
far in favour of the Warsaw Pact that it had an evident ability in
16. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENcE, STATEMENT ON THE DEFECE Ex-
PENDITURES 1975, CIVIND. No. 5976 (1975).
17. JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1974-1975, at 348 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
18. Id. at 330, 349-51, 642-43.
a period of tension to isolate Europe by sea, the effect on Allied
confidence and political cohesion would be profound. 19
To fulfill this second mission of regional defense, there is again
no reason why the Royal Navy must rely on free navigation rights.
The Royal Navy has unimpeded access to the Atlantic and to the
North Sea. NATO ally Denmark would permit access to the Baltic.
If restrictions on naval navigation adversely affected any naval
power in this region, it would be the Soviet Navy, the very force
the Royal Navy means to counter.
With regard to the third naval mission, the British government
has made clear that "commitments outside the NATO area [are]
of the lowest priority in strictly military terms. '20 It is the British
intent, however, to deploy the Navy outside the Eastern Atlantic
and Channel areas "from time to time."2'1 It is only to the extent
that the Royal Navy operates in more distant waters that it will
need to depend on navigation rights. Operations in the Medi-
terranean, for example, could be restricted by unfavorable regimes
controlling the Strait of Gibraltar. But the Royal Navy is with-
drawing from a permanent position in the Mediterranean.22  Con-
tinuing commitments in Hong Kong, Belize, and the Falkland
Islands might call for navigation rights along coasts. Protection
of Britain's vital shipping interests might call for distant-water
naval operations, although the government admits "the Navy, on
its own, would be in no position to defend British merchant ship-
ping outside NATO waters.123  As Great Britain becomes less
interested in and less capable of maritime operations outside of
regional waters, the British naval interest in navigation rights
becomes less great.
On the whole, then, it does not seem that there are pressing
reasons for British naval interests to favor traditional freedoms of
the high seas solely for carrying out naval missions. This should
not be taken to mean that Britain's maritime interests do not, on the
whole, favor navigational freedoms. Shipping, for example, is all
too important for Great Britain to permit the United Kingdom to
abandon a position of free navigation through straits and free navi-
gation outside 12-mile territorial seas. But the analysis would seem
to indicate that questions of mobility for the Royal Navy do not
themselves press Great Britain towards favoring navigation rights.
19. SECRETARY OF STATE, upra note 16, at 9-10.
20. HOUSE OF COMMONS, SECOND REPORT FROM THE EXPENDITURE COMMIT-
TEE: THE DEFENCE REVIEW PROPOsALS, H.C. 259, ix (1975).
21. SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 16, at 15.
22. Id. at 13-15.
23. HousE OF COMMONS, supra note 20, at xii.
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THE UumD STATES NAVY
United States naval interests are between those of the Soviet
Union and of Great Britain; The United States Navy, with the So-
viet Navy, shares concerns of access through straits and navigations
along foreign shores; The United States Navy, with the British
Navy, shares a relatively favorable geographical position.
The importance of navigation rights must be viewed in relation
to the four missions of the United States Navy as officially estab-
lished in 1970 by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R.
Zumwalt, Jr., and as elaborated in an article in 1974 by the Presi-
dent of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner.24
The four missions are strategic deterrence, sea control, protection
of power ashore, and naval presence.
The United States has some 41 SSBNs. Due to the easy access
of the United States to the Atlantic and Pacific and the range of
missiles aboard the SSBNs, Professor Robert E. Osgood concludes:
[T]he absence of a provision for free transit of international straits
in a law of the sea treaty sanctioning 12 mile territorial sea
boundaries, although imposing some hardships on the operations of
the U.S. SSBN fleet, would not seriously weaken its contribution
to nuclear deterrence.25
The effect of restrictive straits' regimes, however, places more
serious limitations on the ability of the Navy to accomplish its -three
conventional missions. The United States Navy has 15 aircraft car-
riers (more than all other navies combined), about 200 surface com-
batants, about 60 amphibious craft, about 70 fleet and patrol sub-
marines, and some 300 other craft.26 In addition, the United
States operates a separate Coast Guard with 40 surface combatant-
type vessels and about 200 other ships.2- Despite the recent Soviet
naval challenge, most observers still rank the United States Navy
the most powerful afloat. More than any other navy, the United
24. Turner, Missions of the U.S. Navy, 26 NAV. WAR. COLL. REV. 2-17
(1974).
25. Osgood, U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law, 2 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L
L.J. 1, 17 (1974).
26. JANE's FGHTInG Smps 1974-1975, at 642-43 (J. Moore ed. 1974). The
number of ships in the United States Navy is an often changing figure and
often disputed. The figures given were generally accepted when this
edition of Jane's was published in 1974.
27. Id. at 515-26.
States Navy has the potential sea control and the projection of
power ashore. The aircraft carrier strength of the United States
Navy permits it to protect its own shipping, deny the oceans to
others, and to attack shore positions with aircraft. The United States
Navy's amphibious capability gives it the possibility of sending
troops ashore, while the surface combatant fleet can hit shore posi-
tions with naval gunfire.
Adverse straits regimes could most seriously affect the United
States Navy in -the Mediterranean where it has had a long-standing
presence and in the Indian Ocean where a naval build-up between
the two superpowers may be beginning.2 The Mediterranean
presence depends on access through the straits of Gibraltar. The
Indian Ocean presence relies on passage through the Indonesian
straits which cuts days off transit time from the Pacific (the alter-
native routes are north, only with difficulty, and south of Aus-
tralia).
Restrictions on coastal passage could impair the sea control, pro-
jection of power ashore, and naval presence roles, all of which often
rely on naval operations off the shores of third states, uninvolved
in any dispute. Given the stake which the United States Navy has
in these three missions, the naval interest of the United States in
maintaining free navigation off foreign shores is clear. Like the
Soviet Union, but unlike Great Britain, distant-water operations are
important for the United States.
One must note, however, that the United States has a relatively
advantageous geographical position when compared with the Soviet
Union. Restrictions on passage through straits and along shorelines
would be much more detrimental to the Soviet Navy than to the
United States Navy. Insofar as such restrictions would affect the
relative balance of the two fleets, it might be that the United States
Navy would be better off vis-A-vis the Soviet Navy if restrictions
were imposed. However, such restrictions would not necessarily
aid the United States Navy in accomplishing tasks unrelated to
those of the Soviet Navy.
ThE FRENCH NAVY
Evaluation of French naval interests in the law of the sea poses
a typical problem. In this study, as in other Anglo-American
28. For the Mediterranean, see Dur, The U.S. Sixth Fleet: Search for
Consensus, 100 U.S. NAy. INST. PRoc. 4, 18-23 (1974); for the Indian
Ocean, see D. Daniel, Naval Presence and Naval Interests: The Case of the
United States Navy in the Indian Ocean, March 20, 1975 (Naval Postgrad-
uate School, Monterey, Cal. Paper presented to the Western Political Sci-
ence Association, Seattle, Wash.).
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studies of French foreign policy, there seems to be a difference
between the objective interests of France and those interests per-
ceived by the French leaders. Objectively, given the position and
capabilities of the French Navy, French naval interests should
resemble those of the British. The French, however, view them-
selves as something of a "mini"-superpower and would align their
naval interests alongside those of the Soviet Union and the United
States.
The authoritative statement of French naval missions can be
found in the Livre Blanc sur la Ddfense Nationale published in two
volumes in 1972 and 1973 by France's Ministry of Defense.29 The
Livre Blanc provides three general objectives for the French armed
forces: the territorial security of France, the security of Europe and
the Mediterranean, and the fulfillment of France's overseas com-
mitments. The crucial element for all is the maintenance of an
independent retaliatory capability.3 0 There is a three-pronged
nuclear potential: airborne, land-based, and SSBN.31 There are
five French SSBNs: Le Redoubtable, Le Terrible, Le Foudroyant,
L'indomptable, and Le Tonnant (not yet operational). The relative
importance of the SSBNs will increase in the next decade because
France's Mirage IV bombers armed with nuclear weapons will prob-
ably be phased out.32 It is generally accepted that the SSBN
force is more secure than France's few land-based nuclear missiles.3 3
As with the United States and Great Britain, France does not rely
on passage through straits to reach the high seas and France's SSBN
force would not be adversely -affected by restrictions on navigation.
The French Navy's conventional forces consist of two aircraft
carriers, about 50 surface combatants, approximately 20 patrol sub-
marines, and about 250 other craft.34 Altogether, the French Navy
holds fourth place among the world's navies and it may well be
that it will pass the Royal Navy within the decade.35 The conven-
29. I M1NuIcRE D'ETAT CHARGL DE LA DFENSE NATIONALE, LJVE BLANC
SUE LA DEFENSE NATiONALE (1972); II id. (1973).
30. V. Giscard d'Estaing, Broadcast over French Television, March 25,
1975, at 1-3 (Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information).
31. I MnSTRE D'ETAT, supra note 29, at 12-13.
32. G. BROSSOLLET, EssAI SUR LA NON-BATAILLE 21 (1975).
33. A. SANGtINEM, LE FRAcAS DES ARmms 24 (1975).
34. JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1974-1975, at 109-32 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
35. Moore, France and Her Navy, 79 NAVY INT'L 10, 11 (1974).
tional forces are intended to provide a threshold, testing the
enemy's seriousness before launching a nuclear attack.80 They are
also meant to give France the capability for intervening abroad to
protect friendly regimes, 7 for defending sealanes and French
trade,38 and for projecting a French naval presence.8 9
In terms of the size of the French Navy and the importance of
its strategic deterrent and threshold missions it would seem that
French naval interests would be little affected by restrictions on
naval passage. SSBN access to the oceans would not be limited
and France's position on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean gives
it an excellent situation for testing a potential enemy's intents
without sending the French Navy through any strait or along any
foreign shore. But the distant-water missions of the French Navy-
foreign intervention, the protection of trade, showing the flag-are
of greater importance than they are for the Royal Navy of roughly
the same size and capability. Perhaps the difference in the
approaches of these two nations can be explained by the relatively
greater reliance which the British place on the Americans and the
correspondingly greater need for the French to assume for them-
selves some of the distant-water operations which the British would
leave with the United States. In any event, French naval interests
are seen by the French to require free navigation through straits
and along coasts.40
CONCLUSION
This brief study has not intended to devise a naval policy toward
the law of the sea for any of the four navies considered. The pur-
pose of this analysis is merely to suggest that the naval interests
of the four principal naval powers in law of the sea issues are not
necessarily similar and to suggest some ways in which these naval
interests might differ. There is considerably more public debate
about naval policy and the law of the sea in Great Britain than
in the United States. 41 This may be due to mutual suspicions in
both the naval and international legal communities here; the
36. Dabezies, The Defence of France and the Defence of Europe, in
R.U.S.I.A BRAssEy's DEFEnC YEAnooK 111-12 (1974).
37. I AlmsrTn D'ETAT, supra note 29, at 22-25.
38. Id. at 24-25.
39. Id. at 25.
40. SANGunamTI supra note 33, at 35-36.
41. Hill, Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea, 17 SURVivAL 2, 69
(1975); O'Connell, supra note 4; Young, New Laws for Old Navies: Mili-
tary Implications of the Law of the Sea, 16 SuRvIvAL 6, 262 (1974). The
outstanding exception which proves the rule in the United States is Osgood,
supra note 25.
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naval people worry that international lawyers do not take defense
concerns seriously enough and the international lawyers believe
naval questions are either too mysterious to be discovered or
too trivial to be worthy of analysis. Whatever the reason, the
British are to be commended for examining the interrelationship
between naval and legal interests; the United States would do well
to follow this example.
